Part of the way through Joe Klein's article in the New Yorker, "Closework." The main thrust I got in the beginning was that the approach used in Desert Storm which was followed during the 90's will no longer work. Instead, hindsight being what it is, what we should have, and should follow is the model of attack used in Panama. Stratfor pointed out (no link, sorry) that following the Panamanian model is difficult in the middle east since we don't have the troop build-up and friendly bases from which to launch the attack. However, it would seem that the key would be to establish several bases in the region that can be used effectively for the kind of simultaneous strike missions used in Panama. This would take a level of diplomatic tip-toeing that is beyond my grasp of the region's issues, but it seems to me a more viable long-term solution than rolling divisions in for sustained occupancy. The problem with the approach I suggest is that it may not cover the point I advocated earlier that the region needs a W.W.2-style nation re-building. The kind we didn't do in Afghanistan in the early 90's. I'm not sure it's possible for myriad small-strike forces to hold a country stable while operating in other countries. Here may be a use for the UN. If the US destabilizes a nation, the UN would need to step in to hold the fort while the people recover from oppression and set up their own stable government. A process of 5-10 years in some countries. Finally there is the Saddam issue which may not be solveable without a true invasion. The variable is the true military capability under his control.
- posted by levinson @ 9/27/2001 08:25:00 AM